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Some Issues of Methods, Theories, and Experimental Designs1 
By James C. Cox 
1. Introduction 
Smith (2008, p. 23) reports an example that illustrates how easily procedures can 
introduce “a future” into an experiment. The example is provided by the central result reported in 
Cox (2000). That paper explores a behavioral phenomenon that has not been included in theories 
of reciprocity or models of unconditional social preferences: the effects of social context on 
reciprocity, trust, and altruism. The weak social context treatment includes the investment game 
and two dictator control games in a triadic design (Cox, 2004) with double blind payoff protocol. 
The strong social context treatment includes the same three games and double blind protocol and 
two added features: (a) an unexplained “second task”; and (b) a coin flip random selection of the 
second task or the first task (investment game or one of the two dictator games) for money 
payoff.2  Introduction of the second task had no significant effect on first movers’ behavior in the 
investment game. But it significantly shifted behavior of second movers in the investment game 
and dictators in both the first-mover dictator-control game and the second-mover dictator-control 
game towards more generous giving: information about the existence of the second task caused 
subjects in these roles to behave as though they were more altruistic. The result is striking 
because the double blind protocol makes it impossible for a subject to have a reputation with 
other subjects or the experimenter and, hence, the random decision selection procedure “should” 
make behavior in the first task independent of information about the existence of the second task.   
 This example involves two of the themes explored in Smith’s (2008) paper, 
“independence of history and future” and “context irrelevance,” that can arise when subjects’ 
multiple decisions within an experiment are not independent. In the following pages, I will 
                                                 
1 Vjollca Sadiraj provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. The National Science Foundation provided 
financial support (grant number IIS-0630805). 
2 After completing the first decision task, the subjects received instructions for the second task, which was  
an investment game with three-person groups as decision making agents. 
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explore related questions that arise in theory and experiments when subjects make multiple 
decisions. These are questions of experimental design, theoretical interpretation of data, and 
behavioral impacts that arise from possible nonseparability of utilities: (a) among decision tasks 
in an experiment; (b) among risky choice options in an experiment; and (c) between decision 
tasks within an experiment and decision tasks outside the experiment. From a theoretical 
perspective, the issues appear to be somewhat different when the experiment involves decisions 
on a lottery space than when it involves decisions on a commodity space.3  
 
2.  Independence, Dual Independence, Wealth Effects, and Portfolio Effects 
 Many experiments on choice under risk (in a “lottery space”) involve multiple decisions 
and random selection of one decision for money payoff. The rationale for this method can be 
illustrated by experiments on the preference reversal phenomenon in which the central question is 
whether subjects reveal inconsistent preferences in choice tasks and valuation tasks. The literature 
on the preference reversal phenomenon contains much discussion of methodological questions, 
which makes it a good example for present purposes. 
 
2.1.  An Illustrative Example: Random Decision Selection in Preference Reversal Experiments  
Consider two simple (usually binary) lotteries A and B. Ask the subjects to choose 
between A and B and, also, to place minimum selling prices on the two lotteries (with an 
incentive-compatible revelation mechanism). A preference reversal occurs when a subject 
chooses one lottery in a pair but places the higher selling price on the other lottery. With 
experimental designs that discriminate between intransitivities and response mode (choice or 
valuation) effects, the data show that most preference reversals cannot be attributed to 
                                                 
3 Principles for design of theory-testing experiments must be based on theory regardless of whether we do 
or do not expect the data to be consistent with theory.  Some, at least informal, theory is needed  to design 
heuristic experiments intended to produce stylized facts; in the absence of any theory we don’t even know 
what variables to record as “data” in an experiment.   
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intransitivities (Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman, 1990; Cox and Grether, 1996).  Robust 
preference reversals that are a response mode effect would constitute a serious problem for 
economics because they would support the conclusion that choice tasks elicit different 
preferences than do valuation tasks.4  But suppose that an experimenter were to pay subjects for 
both tasks at the end of the experiment. In that case, an observed “preference reversal” of the 
above type would not be a problem for standard theory because it could result from a “portfolio 
effect” in the experiment. For example, suppose a risk averse subject prefers lottery A to lottery B 
and, given that returns in lotteries A and B are uncorrelated (because of experiment procedures), 
prefers the diversified portfolio (A, B) to the undiversified portfolios (A, A) and (B, B).  In that 
case, the apparent preference reversal could, instead, be an attempt to construct the individual’s 
optimal diversified portfolio in the only way possible within the experiment: choose one lottery 
and place the higher selling price on the other lottery (because of preferring to keep this one to 
complete the portfolio).  
Such possible portfolio effects can be avoided by realizing stochastic payoffs and 
crediting a subject’s earnings after each decision. But this procedure changes a subject’s wealth 
between decisions and introduces the possibility that an apparent preference reversal could be 
attributed to a change in risk preferences caused by the change in wealth, which is consistent with 
expected utility theory of choice under risk. It is not a problem for such theory if lottery A is 
preferred to lottery B at wealth w1 while lottery B is preferred to lottery A at wealth w2  w1.  In 
order to avoid both possible portfolio effects and wealth effects, an experimenter can follow the 
accepted practice of randomly selecting one of a subject’s decisions for payoff. But the validity of 
this procedure for solving the possible problems in interpreting data depends on the independence 
≠
                                                 
4 As an example, consider the implausibility of conducting a cost-benefit analysis when: (a) project A is 
better than project B with choice task data; but (b) project B is better than project A with valuation task 
data. 
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axiom of expected utility theory (Holt, 1986).5  It is the independence axiom that accounts for 
linearity in probabilities of the expected utility functional, which implies that random selection of 
one decision for payoff will preserve the preference for A over B in all decision tasks.   
If, for example, the dual independence axiom (Yaari, 1987) is assumed, rather than the 
independence axiom, then the utility functional is always linear in payoffs but is linear in 
(decumulative) probabilities only if the agent is risk neutral.  If the dual axiom is assumed then 
possible wealth effects pose no problem for interpreting data, because of linearity in payoffs, but 
random selection of one decision for payoff can be a problem. With probability transformation, 
the relevant distribution is the transformed cumulative (or decumulative) distribution of payoffs 
from all of the decision tasks in the experiment. With a functional of this type, introducing 
random selection of one decision for payoff changes the utilities of multiple decision tasks in a 
fundamental way. This implication holds for the dual theory of expected utility (Yaari, 1989), 
rank dependent expected utility theory (Quiggin, 1993), and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992).6   
 
2.2.  Current Relevance of Random Selection of a Decision 
The above discussion used experiments on the preference reversal phenomenon as an 
example to explicate some conventions of experimental design that have general implications. 
Some recent experiments reported in the literature reveal how these conventions, and their 
theoretical foundations, have current relevance. The recent papers discussed in following 
paragraphs are selected because they report experiments on important topics and incorporate 
                                                 
5 In order to avoid confounding preference reversals with empirical inconsistencies with the independence 
axiom, Cox and Epstein (1989) and Cox and Grether (1996) credited subjects’ earnings after each decision 
and, subsequently, used econometric analysis of data to ascertain whether apparent preference reversals 
could be attributed to wealth effects. There were no significant wealth effects; hence the data provide tests 
for preference reversals that are not confounded with violations of either the independence axiom or the 
dual axiom. 
6 Tversky and Kahneman (2000, pp. 25-26) maintain that, as an empirical result, in some contexts subjects 
isolate on individual decision tasks in multiple task experiments.  Such behavior is inconsistent with rank 
dependent theories, including cumulative prospect theory. 
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experimental designs commonly used in the literature, not because these papers should be singled 
out for special criticism. 
Recent papers report experiments that introduce role reversal into the investment game 
(Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen 2003; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007) in order to test for 
effects of a design change intended to promote subjects’ understanding of the game. Subjects are 
paid for both (first mover and second mover) decisions at the end of the experiment, hence there 
is a possible portfolio effect that confounds comparison of the role-reversal data to data from 
single decision experiments with the investment game without role reversal. As a consequence, 
the effects of role reversal, per se, cannot be indentified with data from the experiment. An 
alternative design would use random selection of one of the two decisions in the role reversal 
treatment for payoff. Given the independence axiom, this would solve the possible portfolio 
effects problem. Without the independence axiom, however, or with an alternative such as the 
dual independence axiom, random selection of one decision for payoff would not solve all 
confound problems, for reasons explained above.  
Another example is provided by recent experiments on risk attitude.  Holt and Laury 
(2002, 2005), Harrison, et al. (2005), and Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) ask subjects to make 
several choices between alternative lotteries in order to measure their risk attitudes. One decision 
is randomly selected for payoff in order to avoid confounds from possible portfolio or wealth 
effects. As explained above, the theoretical foundation for this method is the independence axiom 
of expected utility theory; interpretation of data from these experiments is different if the subjects 
are not expected utility maximizers. If, for example, we assume the dual independence axiom 
rather than the independence axiom then the probability distribution in the utility functional is the 
transformed cumulative (or decumulative) distribution of payoffs from all of the decision tasks in 
the experiment, compounded with the distribution for random decision selection.  In that case, for 
example, the row in the Holt-Laury decision task table at which a subject switches from one 
lottery to another has a different interpretation for a subject’s revealed risk attitude. Given the 
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dual axiom, one should pay off after every decision, since wealth effects are irrelevant, and 
thereby avoid aggregating risks associated with the decision selection lottery with all of the 
underlying lotteries included in the decision tasks. This alternative of paying after every decision 
is also appropriate for other decision theories, such as prospect theory, in which the utility 
functional is defined on income rather than terminal wealth.  
 
2.3  Relevance to the Social Context Experiment  
The experiment in Cox (2000), cited by Smith (2008, p. 23), used random selection of 
one of two decision tasks for payoff and a double blind payoff protocol. Introduction of the 
second task had no significant effect on first movers’ behavior in the investment game but 
significantly shifted behavior of second movers in the investment game and dictators in both the 
first-mover dictator-control game and the second-mover dictator-control game towards more 
generosity. One possible explanation of this finding is that subjects’ behavior is inconsistent with 
the independence axiom and that this accounts for the effect of existence of the second task on 
first task choices. This possible explanation could, of course, be checked by repeating the 
experiment with one change: inform the subjects that they will be paid between the first task and 
the second, as-yet-undefined decision task in the two-task treatment. If the difference between the 
one-task and two-task treatments were to disappear with this design then one could attribute the 
social context effect to inconsistency of behavior with the independence axiom (and consistency 
with the dual axiom). If the difference between the one-task and two-task treatments were to be 
robust to this change in payoff procedures then we would have to look for other possible 
explanations that create interdependence between sequential decision opportunities.   
An interesting candidate explanation is that existence of the second task induces a 
generalized “trusting” response in the first task, in which subjects try to encourage more generous 
behavior by others in the second decision task. This explanation can accommodate the 
insignificant change in first mover behavior in the investment game by postulating that the 
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generalized trusting behavior does not significantly reinforce the specific first-mover trusting 
behavior observed for first movers in the single-task investment game.   
 
3. Context and Separability 
Many experiments on choice under certainty (in a “commodity space”) involve tests or 
applications of utility theories. Analysis of data from such experiments typically depends on an 
(usually implicit) assumption of separability: (a) within parts of an experiment; and (b) between 
the experimental environment and the outside world. First consider the question of within-
experiment separability or nonseparability. 
 
3.1.  Reciprocal Preferences 
Many fairness games studied in experiments have an extensive form in which a first 
mover takes some action with implications that are observed by the second mover before the 
second mover takes action. There are many widely-studied games with this form.7  In some such 
games, second movers’ decisions are responsive to first movers’ decisions in ways known to 
support existence of reciprocity (Cox, 2004; Cox and Deck, 2005; Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 
2008; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008). Such reciprocal behavior is inconsistent with 
Neoclassical preference theory (Hicks, 1937; Samuelson, 1946) in which preferences are a 
characteristic of the agent that is independent of the environment and of actions by other agents. 
Reciprocal behavior is also inconsistent with models of unconditional social preferences such as 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and (the text model in) Charness and 
Rabin (2002) in which the other-regarding preferences are a fixed characteristic of the agent.  
This is a manifestation of the “independence of history and future” property of  theory discussed 
by Smith (2008).  
                                                 
7 Games with this form include the ultimatum game, mini-ultimatum game, investment game, moonlighting 
game, Stackelberg duopoly game, carrot and/or stick games, power to take game, gift exchange game, and 
sequential VCM game. 
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Recently, some progress has been made in incorporating “dependence on history” within 
an experiment into theory with development of models of reciprocity that are supported by data 
from many extensive form fairness games (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007; Cox, Friedman, 
and Sadiraj, 2008). In this theory, “reciprocity” depends both on prior actions by another person 
(Axiom R) and the context or circumstances in which those actions were chosen (Axiom S). 
Axiom S discriminates between acts of commission, acts of omission, and absence of opportunity 
to act in modeling reciprocity. This axiom also incorporates status quo ante a first mover’s 
decision into the theory. In these ways, this theory incorporates “circumstances” of action (Smith, 
2008, pp. 1-2) into modeling reciprocity.  But “dependence on future” has still largely eluded 
theorists, while data provide support for such dependence in the form of experimental 
identification of trusting behavior by first movers in extensive form games (Cox, 2004; Cox and 
Deck, 2005; Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008).   
 
3.2. Incomplete Data and Separability 
Although it is common to model nonreciprocal and reciprocal behavior within experiments 
with utility theory, it is not common to recall the independence assumptions that are (implicitly) 
being made, even though literature on the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) is 
quite specific about this. Literature about GARP explores issues of separability of preferences and 
completeness of data that have general relevance to experimental methods for choice on a 
commodity space.  
Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) demonstrate that GARP is the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of a utility function that rationalizes observations of quantity and price 
vectors. But Varian (1988) explains that the utility maximization hypothesis has no testable 
implication for observations of a proper subset of the commodities chosen by a consumer. 
Furthermore, Varian (1983) explains that utility maximization, when a proper subset of 
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commodities is weakly separable in an individual’s preference ordering, is equivalent to GARP 
inequalities holding for both the weakly separable subset and for all of the commodities. 
Accordingly, when we ask whether a subject’s behavior in a typical laboratory or field 
experiment can be rationalized by a utility function, either in the absence of opportunities for 
reciprocity (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry, 2001; Sippel, 1997; 
Mattei, 2000; Février and Visser, 2004) or in their presence (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007; 
Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008), we are assuming (at least weak) separability between choices 
made within and outside the experiment.8  In the absence of such separability, the utility 
hypothesis has no testable implication for data from a typical laboratory or field experiment 
because the experiment produces observations of a proper subset of the economic choice 
variables that can affect utility (Cox, 1997).  
An implication of the analysis in Varian (1983) is that we can use data from (non-closed 
economy) laboratory and field experiments to test only one of the necessary conditions for utility-
maximizing behavior but we cannot test sufficient conditions because the data needed do not 
exist. The necessary condition we can test for non-reciprocal preference theories is that GARP 
inequalities are satisfied for choice variables observed in the experiment.9 The necessary 
condition we cannot test is that GARP inequalities hold for all choice variables that enter budget 
constraints within and outside the experiment.  Sufficient conditions for the compound hypothesis 
of weak separability and utility maximization are that GARP inequalities are satisfied for both the 
choice variables in the experiment (the separable subset) and all choice variables (within and 
outside the experiment). With data from almost all experiments, only one of the necessary 
                                                 
8 There is a more serious problem in Sippel (1997). The experiment reported in that paper had two linear 
constraints, the usual budget constraint and a second constraint on time allocated to consumption activities. 
With two linear constraints, that sometimes intersect and sometimes do not intersect, GARP is not known 
to be necessary or sufficient for utility-maximizing behavior. Hence tests of such data for GARP violations 
have no known implication.  
9 With or without separability, standard GARP inequalities cannot be applied to test reciprocal preference 
theory because of its distinct implication that opportunities not chosen place restrictions on preferences 
(Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008, pgs. 42-45). 
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conditions can be tested.10  Finding low rates of violation of the one type of necessary condition 
is an important result, but it does not support the conclusion that the subject’s behavior can be 
rationalized by a utility function. This is a prominent example that illustrates Smith’s (2008, p.2) 
point that we are often not careful about distinguishing between “if-then” and “if-and-only-if 
statements.” 
                                                 
10 One known exception are data from the closed economy experiment reported in Battallio, et al. (1973), 
as analyzed in Cox (1997). But such data are extremely hard to generate and may contain significant 
subject selection effects because experimental closed economies are typically populated by incarcerated 
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